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I. FOREWORD: THE TWO STEPS IN FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION
Forensic identification science involves two fundamental steps.
The first step is to compare a questioned item of evidence to an
exemplar from a known source and judge whether they appear so alike
that they can be said to match. The second step is to assess the
meaning of that reported match: What is the probability that the
questioned and the known originated from the same source?1
Professor of Law, Professor of Psychology, and Fellow of the Center for the Study of
Law, Science, and Technology, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University.
Ph.D. 1975, Ohio State University; M.S.L. 1985, Yale Law School.
.. Professor of Law, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law and W.P. Carey School of
Business, Arizona State University. Ph.D. 1989, University of Chicago.
1. From an evidentiary value perspective, the two steps that we identify might be referred
to as "reliability" and "diagnosticity," respectively. See generally DAVID A. SCHUM, EVIDENTIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILISTIc REASONING (1994). The first step involves the reliability of the
evidence because it concerns the value of the expert's testimony for establishing that the
questioned and the known samples do, in fact, share characteristics. The second step involves the
diagnosticity of the evidence because it concerns the value of the match conclusion for drawing
an inference that the questioned and known samples share a common source.
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Different risks of error are present at each step. The risk of
error in the first step is that a reported match between a questioned
and a known sample might not really match. Even if the method used
to compare questioned and known samples were flawless, an error
could occur if, for example, one of the samples had been mislabeled or
mixed up with a different sample. The risk of error associated with the
second step is that, while accurate, the reported match may have
arisen through coincidence and not because the samples share a
common source. The risks of error at both steps affect the ultimate
inferences that can be drawn about the identification evidence in a
case.
2
Both risks are subjects of far too little research. As to the first
step, existing standards and procedures do not provide sufficient
protection from erroneous conclusions that two marks are
indistinguishably alike-that is, that they "match" when in fact they
differ. Few, if any, criminalistics subfields have objective standards for
deciding whether two patterns match. That determination is left to
the judgment of each examiner. For example, consider David Stoney's
discussion of fingerprint examination standards:
How much correspondence between two fingerprints is sufficient to conclude that they
[are the same pattern] ... ? An adequate answer ... is not currently available. The best
answer at present... is that this is up to the individual expert fingerprint examiner to
determine, based on that examiner's training, skill, and experience. Thus, we have an
ill-defined, flexible, and explicitly subjective criterion for establishing fingerprint
identification .... Any unbiased, intelligent assessment of fingerprint identification
practices today reveals that there are, in reality, no standards.
3
The lack of objective standards helps explain the disturbing
findings from the small body of research that has been conducted on
pattern matching by forensic scientists. In some tests, examiners
disagreed with one another about whether various images matched.4
In others, examiners who agreed that two patterns matched disagreed
2. See Jonathan J. Koehler et al., The Random Match Probability (RMP) in DNA Evidence:
Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 215-16 (1995) (arguing that the inferential
limits of a reported match depend more on the risk of error at the first step when the risk of a
coincidental match is very low).
3. David A. Stoney, Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality, in ADVANCES IN
FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY 327, 329 (Henry C. Lee & Robert E. Gaensslen eds., 2d ed. 2001).
4. See, e.g., Jodi Sita et al., Forensic Handwriting Examiners' Expertise for Signature
Comparison, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1117, 1119 (2002) (finding incorrect opinions even among
experienced handwriting analysts); John I. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, The General
Assumptions and Rationale of Forensic Identification, in 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 1, 9 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2006-2007 ed. 2006);
Collaborative Testing Service, Forensic Testing Program, http://www.collaborativetesting.
comlforensics/reportlist.html (various fields, various years).
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(sometimes dramatically) on what constituted the match. 5 Examiners
differ not only in their ability to perceive pattern similarity, but also
in their thresholds for declaring matches.
6
Other research suggests that the match judgments of
experienced criminalists are influenced by extraneous information. A
study by Itel Dror et al. found that four of five fingerprint experts who
previously had identified two prints as a match reached different
conclusions on a later examination, after they learned that the prints
were from different persons. 7  In a follow-up study, six other
fingerprint experts were provided with eight pairs of prints that they
previously had judged.8 The study found that introduction of
contextual information induced four of the six experts to change at
least one of their previous match judgments. Some pairs that were
judged to be exclusions subsequently were judged to be matches, and
vice-versa. Surprisingly, some experts made inconsistent decisions in
the control condition where contextual information was not introduced
(thus reflecting random, and not systematic, error). These results
suggest that criminalists should employ the same kind of blind
examination procedures that are used widely in other fields.9 Such
5. I.W. Evett & R.L. Williams, A Review of the Sixteen Points Fingerprint Standard in
England and Wales, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 49, 59 (1996) (finding that although
examiners agreed that two fingerprints matched, for one pair of prints some examiners believed
they saw as few as ten points of agreement and others as many as forty; for another pair of
prints some examiners saw as few as fourteen points of agreement and others as many as fifty-
six; and so on).
6. Victoria Phillips et al., The Application of Signal Detection Theory to Decision-Making
in Forensic Science, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 294, 300-01 (2001).
7. Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making
Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 74, 76 (2006).
8. Itiel E. Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC
IDENTIFICATION 600, 610 (2006).
9. D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in
Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 45-46
(2002). The phrase "blind examination procedures" can have more than one meaning. Here, we
use the term to refer to blindness or lack of knowledge about facts of the target case or the beliefs
of other investigative or prosecutorial personnel. Such contextual blindness helps ensure that
analysts base their conclusions on the forensic science evidence alone. Blind examination can
also refer to a testing situation in which the analysts who are asked to determine whether two or
more specimens, prints, markings, etc. match are unaware that they are being tested. Across
various forensic fields, the data indicate that analysts' performance improves when the analysts
know that they are being tested. Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Feasibility of External Blind DNA
Proficiency Testing. I. Background and Findings, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 21, 26-27 (2003).
Presumably, analysts behave more vigilantly when they know there are being evaluated. This is
why we and many others believe that casework accuracy rates in the forensic sciences would be
more accurate if measured by performance on proficiency tests in which examiners do not know
they are being tested. Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in
Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 893-94 (2005).
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procedures would protect first-stage judgments from the contextual
influences that contribute to errors.'
0
As Itiel Dror and David Charlton point out, "How rare and
under what conditions errors occur at a practical level is still unclear
at this stage."'" One reason for this knowledge gap is the dearth of
high quality proficiency tests across the various disciplines. Such tests
should be closed (i.e., the analyst is blind to the fact that the test
materials are not part of ordinary case work), be external (i.e.,
administered by a disinterested party), and use realistic case samples.
Unfortunately, proficiency tests that include all three ingredients are
virtually nonexistent. On one hand, results from the proficiency tests
that have been conducted sometimes reveal disturbingly high error
rates. On the other hand, performance on proficiency tests likely
overestimates performance in actual casework because the tests are
open, tend to be relatively easy, and lack the biasing contextual
information that is available in much real casework. 2 Although
forensic science leaders, on occasion, have declared errors to be so
frequent as to be "unacceptable,"' 3 the fact that errors occur with some
regularity signals that a reported match between a pair of markings
probably has less probative value than examiners claim or than judges
and juries assume.
Popular television programs such as CS1'4 and Forensic FilesI5
reinforce the notion of individualization in the collective public
imagination by offering confident pronouncements from scientists
about whose hair was recovered from the knife or which gun fired the
murderous bullet. But can forensic science really make such exact
determinations? Can forensic scientists be sure that a particular
hammer, to the exclusion of all other hammers in the world, produced
the imprints observed on a victim's body? The concept of
individualization, which lies at the core of numerous forensic science
subfields, exists only in a metaphysical or rhetorical sense. There is no
scientific basis for the individualization claims in forensic sciences.
Part II of this Essay explains what we mean by the term
"individualization fallacy" and describes the origins of
individualization in criminalistics. Part III critically examines the
arguments offered in support of the individualization hypothesis. This
10. Robert B. Stacey, Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in the Madrid
Train Bombing Case, 54 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 706, 715 (2004).
11. Dror & Charlton, supra note 8, at 614.
12. Saks & Koehler, supra note 9, at 895.
13. David L. Grieve, Possession of Truth, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 521, 524 (1996).
14. CSI: Crime Scene Investigation (NBC television broadcast 2000-present).
15. Forensic Files (Court TV television broadcast 2000-present).
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Part also addresses the second step in forensic identification: What
inferences can be drawn from a forensic scientist's conclusion that an
exemplar (such as a partial fingerprint, handwriting sample, or
tireprint) matches a known source? Forensic scientists across a broad
array of sub-specialties long have maintained that such a finding is
synonymous with a conclusion that the exemplar marking is produced
by the known source. Part IV gives a historical account of scientists
who have recognized the problem of individualization in forensic
science. Part V offers suggestions for ways to improve the scientific
foundation of identification in criminalistics. Finally, Part VI
concludes that forensic scientists must provide sound evidence for
their conclusions and should avoid exaggerating their results.
II. THE INDMIDUALIZATION FALLACY
In his recent book on DNA typing, David Balding explains
what he terms "the uniqueness fallacy."'16 Attorneys, judges, and
experts commit this fallacy in cases involving DNA evidence when
they assume that a set of genetic markers that is expected to occur
less than once per five billion people (a denominator that roughly
equals the earth's population) must be unique. An illustration is
provided by the following argument offered in the O.J. Simpson
murder trial:
[L]adies and gentlemen, his blood on the rear gate with that match, that makes him one
in 57 billion people that could have left that blood, I mean there is [sic] what, five
million [sic] people on the planet, that means you would have to go through 57 billion
people to find the DNA profile that matches Mr. Simpson's. There is [sic] only five
billion people on the planet. Ladies and gentlemen, that is an identification, okay, that
proves it is his blood. Nobody else's on the planet; no one.
17
Balding refers to a British case in which the appellate judge
made a similar assumption: "I should think there are not more than
27 million males in the United Kingdom, which means that it is
unique."18 Likewise, a forensic science textbook states: "Balthazard
has mathematically determined that the probability of two individuals
having the same fingerprints is one out of 1 x 1060 . . . . This
probability is so small as to exclude the possibility of any two
individuals having the same fingerprints."' 9 In yet another example of
16. DAVID J. BALDING, WEIGHT-OF-EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC DNA PROFILES 148 (2005).
17. Transcript of Closing Argument by Ms. Clark at *21, People v. Simpson, No. BA097211,
1994 WL 737964 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 1994), 1995 WL 672671.
18. R v. Doheny, [1997] 1 Crim. App. 369, 384 (1996).
19. RICHARD SAFERSTEIN, CRIMINALISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC SCIENCE 73 (9th
ed. 2007).
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the same faulty logic, Keith Inman and Nora Rudin argue that objects
of forensic interest are unique by analogy to the asserted uniqueness
of snowflakes, claiming that the number of ways that water molecules
can be arranged into a typical snowflake:
is so astronomically larger than the number of snowflakes that have ever existed that it
is unreasonable to believe that any one arrangement has occurred more that [sic] once.
When a characteristic (or characteristics) of an item can be described in such a fashion,
it is believed to be unique, with no duplicate on earth. It has then been individualized.
2 0
Although markers that rarely occur might be unique, it is a
fallacy to infer uniqueness from profile frequencies simply because
they are smaller than the number of available objects. A simple
analogy clarifies this point: Imagine a machine that prints lottery
tickets with numbers 00 through 99. This machine can print one
hundred different tickets. Suppose that each of ten customers
purchases one ticket and that the machine generates ticket numbers
at random, with replacement. The total number of unique tickets that
could be sold (one hundred) exceeds the population of customers (ten)
by a factor of ten. And yet there is no law of mathematics or nature
that prevents two (or more) customers from being issued different
tickets bearing the same number. Indeed, the probability of that
happening is nearly 40%.21
Some people might be surprised by the rather high chance of
finding matching lottery tickets in this example. Empirical research
demonstrates that people commit an array of errors when describing
and interpreting probabilistic evidence like DNA random match
probabilities. 22 Probabilistic reasoning is hard, and assigning an
appropriate weight to unfamiliar and extreme probabilistic events,
20. KEITH INMAN & NORA RUDIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 4 (1st ed.
1997).
21. The probability of at least two people sharing a winning lottery ticket in our example is
100 x99 x98 x... x91
1 - (1)0 37 .2 % .
10.
This computation is similar to that used to solve the famous "birthday problem," in which the
probability that two people in a small gathering would have the same birth date is found to be
far greater than human intuition would suggest. See Persi Diaconis & Frederick Mosteller,
Methods For Studying Coincidences, 84 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 853, 857 (1989).
22. See, e.g., David H. Kaye et al., Statistics in the Jury Box: How Jurors Respond to
Mitochondrial DNA Match Probabilities, J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=996134; Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the
Presentation of DNA Evidence, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (1993); Jonathan J. Koehler & Laura




such as those that occur 0.1% or 0.001% of the time, is particularly
challenging. Certainly, a criminalist's work and a fact-finder's task
would be simplified if they could assume that physical evidence
reportedly matching a potential source resulted in unique and
absolute identification of the source of the evidence. Unfortunately,
that is not possible on current knowledge. This is the central point of
this Essay. The concept of "individualization," which lies at the core of
numerous forensic science subfields, exists only in a metaphysical or
rhetorical sense. It has no scientific validity, and it is sustained
largely by the faulty logic that equates infrequency with uniqueness.
We next discuss the implications of this fallacy and offer suggestions
for how the science and practice of criminalistics might proceed in its
absence.
A. Reliance on the Notion of Individualization
The "individualization fallacy," as we term it, is a more
fundamental and more pervasive cousin of Balding's uniqueness
fallacy. Criminalists seek to individualize crime scene evidence to its
unique source and frequently claim to have achieved individualization
in specific instances. Individualization has been defined as "[t]he
process of placing an object in a unit category that consists of a single
unit. Individualization implies uniqueness."23 Individualization refers
to "absolute specificity and absolute identification." 24  Though
occasionally criminalists are more conservative, for nearly a century
they clearly and repeatedly have characterized individualization as
fundamental to what they do. "Criminalistics is the science of
individualization." 25 "Individualization is unique to forensic science."26
"The concept of individualization is clearly central to the consideration
of physical evidence .... Our belief that uniqueness is both attainable
and existent is central to our work as forensic scientists."27 A forensic
science textbook states:
The major members of the pattern group are fingerprints, questioned documents, tool
mark, and firearms evidence, and other patterns, such as footwear and tire impressions.
This kind of evidence consists of patterns that might be called individualization
23. Thornton & Peterson, supra note 4, at 11.
24. David A. Stoney, What Made Us Ever Think We Could Individualize Using Statistics?,
31 J. FORENSIC SCI. SOCY 197, 197 (1991).
25. James W. Osterburg, The Evaluation of Physical Evidence in Criminalistics: Subjective
or Objective Process?, 60 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 97, 97 (1969).
26. PETER R. DE FOREST ET AL., FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINALISTICS 7
(1983).
27. KEITH INMAN & NORAH RUDIN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINALISTICS: THE
PROFESSION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 45, 123 (200 1).
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patterns. Under favorable circumstances, individualization-pattern evidence can be
attributed to a unique source.
2 8
To practicing forensic scientists, individualization is more than
an abstraction or an idealization; it is the state of their art. For
example, a firearms examiner testifying in a federal court claimed to
be able to identify the unknown weapon "to the exclusion of every
other firearm in the world. '29 Similar claims are made by examiners of
other kinds of toolmarks, 30 as well as of fingerprints, 31 bitemarks,32
handwriting, 33 shoeprints, 34 tiremarks, 35 and other objects of forensic
interest. Even practitioners from areas where the inability to
individuate is recognized might offer testimony that borders on
individualization. For example, a microscopic hair comparison expert
testified that when questioned and known hairs are consistent, "the
[questioned] hairs either did originate from that [known] source, or
there could be or might be another individual in the world somewhere
that might have the same microscopic characteristics. '36
Elsewhere, we have used the phrase "discernible uniqueness"
to capture the presumption of criminalists who object that uniqueness
is not merely a hypothetical construct, but a conclusion that is
frequently attainable in practice.37 The assumption of discernible
uniqueness endows criminalistics with important practical benefits. It
enables criminalists to assert definitive conclusions in casework. At
the same time, it relieves criminalistics of the rigors of developing
measures of object attributes and collecting population data on the
frequencies of variations in those attributes. It also exempts the
various subfields from determining the proper statistical model for
estimating random match probabilities, calculating those probabilities
in actual cases, and explaining to judges and juries the extent to
28. Robert E. Gaensslen & Kimberly R. Young, Fingerprints, in FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO SCIENTIFIC AND INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES 341 (Stuart H. James & Jon J.
Nordby eds., 2d ed. 2005) (emphasis omitted).
29. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005).
30. E.g., Fletcher v. Lane, 446 F. Supp. 729, 731 (S.D. Ill. 1978).
31. Resolution VII, IDENTIFICATION NEWS, Aug. 1979, at 1. By prohibiting the use of
qualified or probabilistic conclusions, fingerprint examiners compel themselves to give only
absolute opinions. That is, they can testify only that they have "identified" the source of the
fingerprint to a certainty, or they must refrain from giving an opinion on the source of the print.
32. E.g., People v. Milone, 356 N.E.2d 1350, 1355-56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
33. E.g., ALBERT S. OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS 231,261,344, 381-84 (2d ed. 1929).
34. E.g., WILLIAM J. BODzIAK, FOOTWEAR IMPRESSION EVIDENCE 3 (CRC Press 1995) (1990).
35. E.g., William J. Bodziak, Forensic Tire Impression and Tire Track Evidence, in
FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SCIENTIFIC AND INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES, supra
note 28, at 377, 387-89.
36. Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1554 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
37. Saks & Koehler, supra note 9, at 892.
206 [Vol. 61:1:199
FORENSIC EVIDENCE
which different objects could share a common set of observable
characteristics. In short, without the assumption of discernible
uniqueness, far more scientific work would be necessary, and
criminalists would need to offer more tempered opinions in court.
B. Origins and Evolution of the Notion of Individualization
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) developed the
ontological principle of the identity of indiscernibles ("Leibniz's
Law").38 This metaphysical principle states that if there is no way to
tell two entities apart, they are one and the same entity. Although
philosophers disputed the principle and offered counterexamples,
39
echoes of Leibniz's law appear in arguments for individualization.
The first potentially scientific notion of uniqueness originated
with Lambert Adolphe Jacques Qu6telet (1796-1874), a Belgian
statistician and sociologist best known as the father of descriptive
social statistics. 40 Qu6telet hypothesized that "nature never repeats."
41
He based that notion on the product rule, a fundamental tool of
probability theory that yields the joint probability of independent
events by multiplying their separate probabilities. 42 When an object
has many attributes, each of which can take on numerous different
values, and each attribute is uncorrelated with every other attribute,
there are long odds against the complete repetition of the attributes'
pattern.
Alphonse Bertillon (1853-1914) learned of Qu~telet's theory
from his father and grandfather, serious students of statistics,
anthropology, medicine, and demography. 43 From his position as a
records clerk with the Paris police, Bertillon overcame the resistance
of his superiors and used Qu6telet's hypothesis to develop the first
system of forensic identification, termed "anthropometry," or
bertillonage.44 Bertillon measured eleven different physical features of
each prisoner and assembled the prisoner profiles into special files
38. Peter Forrest, The Identity of Indiscernibles, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., (2006)
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112006/entries/identity-indiscernible/.
39. See, e.g., Max Black, The Identity of Indiscernibles, 61 MIND 153 (1952).
40. 9 NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 855 (15th ed. 1990) (describing Adolphe Qu~telet).
41. See John I. Thornton, Letter to the Editor, The Snowflake Paradigm, 31 J. FORENSIC
Sci. 399, 399 (1986) (referencing Qu~telet's hypothesis, but noting that Qu6telet actually used
slightly different words from those in this quote commonly attributed to him).
42. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1477, 1512-14 (1999).
43. SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL
IDENTIFICATION 33-34 (2001).
44. Id. at 32-33; JURGEN THORWALD, THE CENTURY OF THE DETECTIVE 3, 9-13, 20-26 (1965).
2008]
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reflecting their classifications. 45 If the prisoners were measured
properly and if Qu6telet were correct, then Bertillon would be able to
identify prisoners who had been arrested before and who were using
aliases on re-arrest (to avoid longer sentences for being recidivists).
Pioneers in each forensic identification subfield followed the
lead of Qu6telet and Bertillon by invoking the product rule to argue
that no two of a certain type of object could be mistaken one for
another. Thus, Balthazard argued for the uniqueness of fingerprints,
46
Osborn for handwriting,47  Goddard for firearms, 48  May for
toolmarks, 49 and so on. Proponents of these theories made no efforts to
test the assumed independence of attributes, and they did not base
explicit computations on actual observations. Indeed, they neither
obtained nor offered empirical data of any sort to support the theories.
Sir Francis Galton is the one exception among forensic
identification pioneers. A major early contributor to the study of
fingerprints, Galton remains one of the few students of any of these
techniques to attempt to collect empirical data and to subject the data
to meaningful probabilistic analysis.50  He never was convinced
entirely of fingerprints' ability to individualize, and he never believed
that the field to which he made such important contributions was
scientifically superior to anthropometry. 51 This apparent irony will not
seem ironic to conventional scientists, who know that those who
perform empirical tests tend to be more sober about the phenomenon
under study than those who merely theorize.
III. UNPROVED AND PERHAPS UNPROVABLE
Even without supportive data, various arguments have been
offered on behalf of the individualization hypothesis. None are
45. COLE, supra note 43, at 34.
46. No Two Finger Prints Alike, 105 SC. AM. 166 (1911).
47. OSBORN, supra note 33, at 231, 381-82.
48. Calvin H. Goddard, Scientific Identification of Firearms and Bullets, 17 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 254, 262-63 (1926).
49. Luke S. May, The Identification of Knives, Tools and Instruments a Positive Science, 1
AM. J. POLICE SCI. 246, 246-47, 255 (1930).
50. For recent work which makes use of empirical data and subjects them to probabilistic
analysis, see Nicole M. Egli et al., Computation of Likelihood Ratios in Fingerprint Identification
for Configurations of Three Minutia, 51 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1255 (2006), which uses a database of
818 loops and 216 fingerprints from two donors to show that partial fingerprint matches produce
large likelihood ratios, and Cedric Neumann et al., Computation of Likelihood Ratios in
Fingerprint Identification for Configurations of Any Number of Minutiae, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 54
(2007), which tests a model for computing fingerprint identification likelihood ratios based on a
sample of 686 loops and 204 arches.
51. See COLE, supra note 43, at 92.
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scientifically compelling. Some arguments rely on the metaphysical
notion that because no two objects can be the same object, they will
inevitably manifest observable differences. Some rely on appeals to
venerated authority (dead members of our field said it was so),
contemporary authority (living members of our field say it is so),
wishful thinking (because object variability has been observed, there
will always be discernible differences between any two objects), or the
personal experience of practitioners (as if by doing casework on pairs
of objects the nature of the population and relationships within that
population are revealed).52 These approaches amount to nothing more
than faith and intuition.
The only rigorous argument offered to support the hypothesis
of individualization derives from the product rule, suggested by
Qu~telet and relied on by those who founded the various subfields of
criminalistics. According to the rule, the probability that each of a
series of independent events will occur is given by the product of their
unconditional probabilities. 53 Attempts to use the product rule to
support individualization run into several problems. First, proper
application of the rule requires a set of reliable frequency estimates
for the relevant set of forensic characteristics. Second, the
characteristics must be independent of each other. Third, even if the
first two problems are overcome, application of the product rule
necessarily falls short of establishing unique individualization. The
product of probabilities greater than zero always yields a value
greater than zero. The probabilistic approach, therefore, always leads
to the conclusion that a source other than the suspected individual or
object might exist.5
4
Alarmed by the prospect of courts following rigorous new
judicial55 and statutory56 requirements for the admission of expert
evidence, forensic scientists recently have undertaken studies
intended to prove that no two sets of markings left by distinct objects
can be indistinguishably alike. That such studies were not undertaken
52. Sandy A. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 143, 155-56, 162-63, 168-69, 176-
179 (2005).
53. Posner, supra note 42.
54. See, e.g., HAROLD CUMMINS & CHARLES MIDLO, FINGER PRINTS, PALMS AND SOLES: AN
INTRODUCTION TO DERMATOGLYPHICS 150-55 (Dover Publications 1961) (1943); Stoney, supra
note 24.
55. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (requiring
courts to engage in a "gatekeeping" role, inquiring into both the relevance and the reliability of
the expert testimony); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 138 (1999) (interpreting
Daubert to apply not only to " 'scientific' testimony, but to all expert testimony").
56. FED. R. EVID. 702 (codifying a three-part test for determining whether to admit expert
testimony). The Rule was amended in 2000 in response to both Daubert and Kumho Tire.
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until this late in the history of these disciplines is remarkable. How
did the practice get so far ahead of the science? Why could it be
concluded, a century after fingerprint experts began testifying in
courts, that "the suggestion that recorded fingerprints are unique has
never been rigorously checked"? 57 The few existing studies were
launched with the problematic goal of trying to prove empirically what
for so long had been asserted on faith. Given the pressures that
precipitated the studies, it is not surprising that, even when they fell
short of proving what they set out to prove, they were proclaimed to
have met their goals.
58
For example, Lockheed Martin conducted the first noteworthy
study aimed at proving the uniqueness of fingerprints at the request
of the FBI in 1999. 59 Lockheed Martin undertook this project during
the first case in which the admissibility of fingerprint identification
testimony was challenged under Daubert.60 In that study, each of
50,000 file prints was compared to itself and to the others in the file
using the Automated Fingerprint Identification System ("AFIS"). The
authors concluded that it is virtually impossible for any two
fingerprints to be indistinguishably alike. But in a detailed critique of
the study published in a statistics journal, David Kaye identified
substantial errors in the study's design and analysis that cast serious
doubt on its conclusions. 61 According to Kaye, this study-which, he
notes, was "unpublished and prepared expressly for litigation"-
provides "a lesson about probabilities generated for use in litigation: If
such a probability seems too good to be true, it probably is."
6 2
Sargur Srihari et al. conducted a study "to establish the
individuality of handwriting. 63 The authors noted that such an
inquiry never had been undertaken but was now necessary because of
reliability concerns raised by the courts.64 Even though the design of
this study-a relatively small sample of writers and large samples of
57. BALDING, supra note 16, at 54; see also David H. Kaye, Questioning a Courtroom Proof
of the Uniqueness of Fingerprints, 71 INT'L STAT. REV. 521 (2003); Stoney, supra note 3; Zabell,
supra note 51, at 164-67.
58. See D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, A House with No Foundation, 20 ISSUES
Sci. & TECH. 35 (2003), for examples of such studies.
59. Lockheed Martin Co., 50K vs. 50K Fingerprint Comparison Test (1999) (unpublished
study).
60. See United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 223-26 (3d Cir. 2004) (outlining the details
of the study done at the district court level).
61. Kaye, supra note 57, at 526-28.
62. Id. at 524, 528; see also Stoney, supra note 3, at 378-83; Zabell, supra note 52, at 164-67.
63. Sargur N. Srihari et al., Individuality of Handwriting, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 856, 857
(2002).
64. Id. at 856-57.
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writing-favored distinguishing each writer from the others in the
sample, the analysis fell short of its goal.65 Even had the study
succeeded within its own sample, it would not have answered the
crucial question whether every writer in the population is distinct
from every other writer. Indeed, this study has been critiqued in some
detail.6
6
The claim of unique individuality cannot be proven with
samples, especially samples that are a tiny proportion of the relevant
population. As Balding commented: "It is impossible to prove any
human characteristic to be distinct in each individual without
checking every individual, which has not been done."67 Anything less
results in probability statements rather than conclusions of absolute
specificity and absolute identification.
With no coherent theory to support the individualization
hypothesis and few studies that attempt to test the hypothesis,
proponents have looked for other evidence that arguably supports a
claim of discernible uniqueness. 68 Some have seized on studies finding
that monozygotic twins had discernibly different fingerprints.
69 If
identical twins do not have identical fingerprints, proceeds the logic,
then surely everyone else has distinguishable prints. Though
appealing at first, reflection suggests that the uniqueness hypothesis
would have found greater support if identical twins did have identical
fingerprints. If that were true, one could argue that if the phenotype of
fingerprints is isomorphic with the genotype, then whatever diversity
exists in fingerprint genotypes will be reflected in fingerprint
65. See id. at 871.
66. Michael J. Saks, Commentary, Individuality of Handwriting, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 916,
916-17 (2003). The critique pointed out that, in fact, Srihari et al. had not found that each writer
could be distinguished with certainty from every other writer in their sample, even though the
design of the study made the likelihood of finding such distinctions unusually large, given: (1)
the design of the sample (aiming to obtain a representation of writers spread across the United
States, rather than from homogeneous writing communities); (2) the size of the inter-writer
sample (much too small for the research question); (3) the size of the writing sample (far more
words and forms and variations than encountered in virtually any forensic setting); (4) the size of
the intra-writer sample (too small to capture the variation present within writers); and (5)
reliance on cursive writing (so the study is irrelevant to many forensic instances of small
amounts of hand printing or numbers). Moreover, the study involved no human examiners, only
computer-based pattern recognition. Id. So whatever the study found, it could not tell us how
well or poorly humans could distinguish one writer from another. (The authors assumed that
humans could do better than the computer, but that remains an untested empirical question.) Id.
at 917.
67. BALDING, supra note 16, at 54.
68. The reader is reminded that the phrase "discernible uniqueness" is merely a shorthand
way to describe the criminalists' presumption that conclusions about object uniqueness are not
only theoretically possible but attainable in practice. See supra text accompanying note 37.
69. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 223, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).
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phenotypes. But if unspecified random and systematic events are
interposed along the pathway from genotype to phenotype, 70 the need
for a rigorous scientific approach that takes into account the
probability of duplication becomes more, not less, necessary. 71
Another argument offered in support of the object
individualization hypothesis is that, in examining many pairs of
objects in their casework, examiners have not yet come across two sets
of markings produced by different sources that are indistinguishable
from each other.72  This observational argument has three
shortcomings. First, as Karl Popper famously explained, it is logically
impossible to prove a hypothesis by accumulating positive instances.73
The hypothesis, "all swans are white," remains unproven, even after a
large number of sightings of white swans, because the sighting of a
single black swan would disprove it. Similarly, the hypothesis that no
two objects are indistinguishably alike cannot be proven true from an
accumulation of observations in which different object sources produce
distinctive markings. 74
The second weakness is that criminalists across disciplines
have made no systematic, concerted effort to find different objects that
produce identical markings. In casework, forensic examiners compare
questioned marks to those of the suspect and, sometimes, to other
persons involved in the case. Even a very large number of pairwise,
case-by-case comparisons made by individual examiners would not
provide a satisfactory method for testing the object uniqueness claim.
70. See W.J. Babler, Prenatal Development of Dermatoglyphic Patterns: Associations with
Epidermal Ridge, Volar Pad and Bone Morphology, 11 COLLEGIUM ANTROPOLOGICUM 297 (1987)
(performing an empirical study to test theories that the shape of volar pads on the finger of a
fetus determines the ridge configuration on the finger and analyzing the results as suggesting
possible support for the theories).
71. Handwriting examiners have also argued that differences in writing between identical
twins support the conclusion that handwriting is unique. See, e.g., United States v. Hidalgo, 229
F. Supp. 2d 961, 963 (D. Ariz. 2002) (referencing several such studies). The court found that the
studies presented by the proponent did not support the proposition argued. Id. On the other
hand, it is hard to understand why one should expect that having the same genotype would
cause twins to write indistinguishably alike, and why a finding that they did not write
indistinguishably alike would lead to the inference that no writings on earth are
indistinguishably alike.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 852, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
(concerning fingerprints); David L. Grieve, Simon Says, 51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 85
(2001) (same).
73. KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 33, 40-42, 62-63, 68-70, 252-54
(2d prtg. 1961).
74. Cf. Ronald G. Nichols, Defending the Scientific Foundations of the Firearms and Tool
Mark Identification Discipline: Responding to Recent Challenges, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 586, 592
(conceding that "individuality cannot be absolutely proven because it is impossible to examine
every tool in the world to a tool mark in question").
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To illustrate, suppose that exactly 100 pairs of firearms out of an
estimated 100,000 guns in a Texas town share indistinguishable gun
barrel markings. If each of 100 firearms experts examined 10 pairs of
guns from the town's gun population every day for 10 years
(n=3,650,000 gun pairs), there is about a 93% chance that none of the
indistinguishable pairs will have come under examination. That is,
despite 1,000 "collective years" of forensic science experience (100
experts multiplied by 10 years), the failure to find even a single pair of
guns with indistinguishable markings would offer little basis for
drawing conclusions about whether gun barrel markings, even in this
single town, are unique. Examiners rarely search a large database for
multiple possible matches. Indeed, very few subfields even have such
databases. Conducting a serious search for matches, and failing to find
any, would have strengthened markedly the observational argument.
But under the available search conditions, falsification of the
individualization hypothesis has been unlikely, and so the lack of
falsification proves very little. As the size of a comparison database
becomes larger, the object uniqueness hypothesis is subjected to an
increasingly tough empirical test. If, under these circumstances,
scientists still do not find indistinguishably similar matches produced
by different objects, then object uniqueness becomes a more credible
theory.
A third weakness is that indistinguishable markings produced
by different objects already have been found in a number of forensic
subfields. Consider, for example, an analysis of signatures taken from
a voter registration database that revealed numerous
indistinguishably alike signatures. 75 Similarly, cases have been
documented in which the fingerprints of one person were identified as
someone else's. 76 There also have been many false positive
identifications of bitemarks.
77
In sum, no sound and rigorous evidence supports the
assumption of unique individualization. Moreover, the assumption is
75. John J. Harris, How Much Do People Write Alike: A Study of Signatures, 48 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 647, 647 (1958) (finding that "many of these signatures lacked individuality and
looked alike").
76. Simon A. Cole, The Prevalence and Potential Causes of Wrongful Conviction by
Fingerprint Evidence, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 39, 57 (2006).
77. C. Michael Bowers, Problem-Based Analysis of Bitemark Misidentifications: The Role of
DNA, 159 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L S104, S106-07 (Supp. 2006). Bowers observed that "dental experts
seldom agree with one another at trial," citing controlled studies finding erroneous
identifications or exclusions of between 24% and 91%, "63.5% false positives," and "false positive
identifications of 11.9-22.0% for various groups of forensic odontologists." Id. He further cited
seven cases in recent years where DNA typing contradicted the conclusions of forensic dentists
that the defendant was the source of a crime scene bitemark. Id.
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so heroic and the research required to test it seriously would be so
massive that one must doubt whether it is possible to conduct an
empirical study or set of studies that would provide solid support for
the hypothesis.
IV. OLD NEWS
While criminalistics continues to depend on the theory of
individualization and the assumption that it is attainable in practice,
thoughtful and informed scientists long have recognized the lack of
evidence for that core belief. In the 1940s, a team of biomedical
researchers tried mightily to develop support for individualization in
fingerprints, but ultimately concluded that "it is impossible to offer
decisive proof that no two fingerprints bear identical patterns."78
Nearly half a century later, David Stoney published an article
entitled, What Made Us Ever Think We Could Individualize Using
Statistics?79 Elsewhere, Stoney has said: "The criteria for absolute
identification in fingerprint work are subjective and ill-defined. They
are the product of probabilistic intuitions widely shared among
fingerprint examiners, not of scientific research. Outside of the
fingerprint profession this is generally unappreciated."8 0 Similarly,
Thornton and Peterson observed:
[T]hough individualization is clearly the goal toward which forensic science strives, it
can be achieved only in a probabilistic sense, of reducing uncertainty to the smallest
possible amount .... Behind every opinion rendered by a forensic scientist there is a
statistical basis. We may not know what that basis is, and we may have no feasible
means of developing an understanding of that basis, but it is futile to deny that one
exists.
8 1
An FBI Laboratory committee recently assembled "to evaluate the
fundamental basis for the science of friction ridge skin impression
pattern analysis" concluded that "[e]mpirical studies can never prove
absolutely the hypothesis of uniqueness. 8 2 Also, in reference to
78. CUMMINS & MIDLO, supra note 54, at 154.
79. Stoney, supra note 24.
80. David A. Stoney, Fingerprint Identification: Scientific Status, in 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra note 4, at 339, 358.
81. Thornton & Peterson, supra note 4, at 11, 32.
82. Bruce Budowle et al., Review of the Scientific Basis for Friction Ridge Comparisons as a
Means of Identification: Committee Findings and Recommendations, 8 FORENSIC SCI. COMM.
(2006), http://www.fbi.govfhqflab/fsc/backissu/jan2006/research/2006_01_researchO2.htm. The
quoted statement is somewhat paradoxical. The claim of uniqueness is by definition "absolute,"
but the Committee suggests it must be accepted as true even if there is no way to provide
"absolute proof." See id. One wonders why the FBI Committee didn't simply scale back the claim
so it can stand on whatever ground is available to support it. The committee offered three lines of
argument to justify belief in uniqueness: anecdotal evidence, comparisons of identical twins, and
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fingerprint identification, European forensic scientists Christophe
Champod and Ian Evett carefully have examined "a major
contradiction between the scientific status that is claimed and the
operational paradigm to which its practitioners subscribe."8 3 They ask
whether "a statement of an 'absolute conclusion' [can be] compatible
with scientific reasoning" and whether "the denial of probabilistic
reasoning [can be] compatible with a scientific pursuit."8 4 They
conclude that "an inductive process must be probabilistic" and that
"denial of that state of affairs" is illogical and unscientific.8 5 In the
firearms and toolmark area, Alfred Biasotti, John Murdock, and Bruce
Moran have noted that "existing research was insufficient to validate
the quantitative objective criteria necessary to conclude that a
working surface is unique."8 6 Inman and Rudin allow that examiners
in various subfields of criminalistics do not yet have the science to
back up their claims, so they are merely "making the leap" to
individualization.8
7
Why, then, do many criminalists ascribe greater powers to
their fields than the research evidence supports? Part of the problem
may be that most practitioners are not well schooled in the
probabilistic nature of scientific claims. Or perhaps practitioners
simply are not aware of the dearth of scientific support for their
discipline's core assumptions. For example, evidence of dental
uniqueness is limited to "a small number of journal articles which are
less than persuasive in their efforts to prove uniqueness scientifically,"
yet "91% [of forensic dentists] support dental uniqueness and 78%
believe that uniqueness transfers faithfully to human skin."8 8 Or
perhaps the adversarial environment in which most forensic scientists
operate induces them to exaggerate the probative value of the
evidence about which they are testifying. Whatever the explanation,
the "belief that the stresses, strains, and tensions across an area of friction ridge skin are
random, infinite, and independent." See id. The weaknesses of each argument are addressed
elsewhere in this Essay.
83. Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, Commentary, A Probabilistic Approach to
Fingerprint Evidence, 51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 101, 101 (2001).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 117.
86. Alfred Biasotti et al., Firearms and Toolmark Identification: Scien'ific Issues, in 4
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra note 4, at
544, 565.
87. INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 27, at 123, 147-51.
88. C. Michael Bowers, Identification from Bitemarks: Scientific Issues, in 4 MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra note 4, at 625, 647-
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the obvious question arises: What can be done to remedy the
contradiction between knowledge and practice?
V. WHAT TO Do
Knowledgeable forensic scientists have recognized for quite
some time that criminalists' belief in individualization is based on
anecdote, intuition, and speculation rather than on scientific
foundation. Consequently, individualizations in casework rely on a
"leap of faith." To remedy this shortcoming, Inman and Rudin have
called on the forensic science community "to produce a body of
empirical work that can support that pragmatic leap of faith to a
conclusion of a single common source."8 9 But this puts the cart before
the horse. Scientists and serious practitioners customarily refrain
from making inferential leaps unjustified by data. They confine their
statements to what is known and supportable, not to what they take
on faith.
While waiting for the necessary knowledge base to develop,
what can forensic scientists do to contribute to a fact-finder's
understanding of the evidence in a case without exaggerating or
distorting that contribution? Moreover, what can forensic and other
scientists do to build the necessary scientific foundation?
A. The Present
For the present, when criminalists cannot distinguish a
questioned pattern from a known pattern (i.e., when they judge a
questioned and a known pattern to be indistinguishable or consistent,
or to "match"), criminalists should report that finding with the
appropriate clarity and restraint. For example, they could explain that
a conclusion that two patterns are consistent (or a match) does not
require a conclusion that the patterns share a common source. Once
they have explained this point, criminalists should resist the urge to
draw a source conclusion-or any other inference-that is not
supported by sound theory and hard data.90
Examiners should explain that, in finding that two patterns
match, they have placed the suspect object or person in a pool of one or
more objects that match the evidentiary marks. The strength of the
89. INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 27, at 151.
90. Judicial thinking can be found that approximately parallels this restraint. See, e.g.,
United States v. Llera Plaza, 57 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 983, 1002-05, 1016-17 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27,
2002), vacated and superseded on reconsideration, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002); United
States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69-71 (D. Mass. 1999).
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likelihood that the known object or person shares a common source
with the questioned object or person depends on the size of the pool.
No scientific justification exists for assuming that the size of the pool
is one. And, for most areas of criminalistics (other than DNA typing
and, potentially, fingerprinting), there are no empirically grounded
estimates of how large such pools might be. Experts should not
substitute their intuition or judgment in an effort to fill these
knowledge gaps. The speculation of an examiner about the size of
those pools is not scientific evidence.
Nevertheless, if a court encourages or permits an examiner to
venture a guess about the size of the matching pool, the guess ought to
reflect something akin to confidence intervals in statistics.9 1 The
interval should be set wide enough to have a high probability of
including the actual number that might be in the pool. As the
necessary research proceeds, those confidence intervals can narrow
appropriately. But no data that could permit forensic scientists to offer
an identification "to the exclusion of all others in the world" exist, and
they are unlikely to come into being in the foreseeable future.9 2 Such
testimony is speculative and improper, both scientifically and legally.
B. The Future
For the future, traditional forms of forensic identification
should begin to emulate the general model used in DNA typing.
Whether geneticists believe in the biological uniqueness of individuals,
they know that DNA tests examine only a fraction of the genome.
Even if two DNA samples match on a dozen or more alleles,
geneticists know that the samples might not share a common source
because differences might exist between the samples on untested
alleles. They also know that their data reflect samples of people, not
genetic censuses of the human population.9 3 The solution to this
problem in DNA typing has been a frank reliance on probability: the
population (and subpopulation) frequencies of the observed genetic
attributes are estimated through sampling; the independence of those
attributes is verified; and the product rule is applied to the individual
91. See generally David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 83, 90, 115-21 (2d ed. 2000)
(outlining specific concerns presented by experts drawing inferences from their statistical data
when testifying); David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Statistical Proof, in 1 MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, supra note 4, at 219, 231-
32, 274-79 (same).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 29-36.
93. As one sometimes sees in televised forensic science fiction.
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frequencies to determine the joint probability of the occurrence of that
set of attributes in the population. This latter estimate then is
reported to fact-finders to help them assess the probative value of the
DNA evidence.
94
Similar procedures, in principle, can be employed for other
materials of forensic interest: fingerprints, handwriting, bitemarks,
toolmarks, and so on. Criminalists face two challenges in developing
such procedures. One challenge will be developing valid and reliable
measures of the images of interest-of friction ridges, of toolmark
striations, of bitemarks, of writing. A second challenge will be
developing databases that identify the frequency with which various
images appear. In some areas (e.g., toolmarks, firearms, and
shoeprints), the challenge of producing sound probability estimates
may be especially difficult because the materials change over time and
with use.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Essay challenges the conventional wisdom about the
capabilities of the forensic identification sciences. Forensic scientists
are not able to link a fingerprint, a hair, a handwriting sample, a
tiremark, a toolmark, or any other evidentiary forensic item to its
unique source, but they assert that ability every day in court. The
issue is not the sincerity of the beliefs of workaday forensic scientists.
Instead, it is whether any scientific evidence exists that can support
those beliefs. No basis exists in theory or data for the core contention
that every distinct object leaves its own unique set of markers that
can be identified by a skilled forensic scientist. Their claims
exaggerate the state of their science. This sort of exaggeration,
combined with public credulity, is the classic reason that common law
evidence doctrine required a heightened threshold for admission of
expert testimony. Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as
interpreted by Daubert and Kumho Tire, such testimony would be a
prime target for exclusion.95 But, short of exclusion, the legal
community would do well to understand the individualization fallacy,
94. Although the DNA typing model has much to offer the traditional forensic sciences,
offering source identifications at trial for sufficiently low probabilities would not be an
implication of the science but an evasion of it in the service of advocacy. See Bruce Budowle et
al., Source Attribution of a Forensic DNA Profile, 2 FORENSIC SCI. COMM. (2000),
http://www.fbi.gov/hqlab/fsc/backissu/july2000/source.htm.
95. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 138 (1999); Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993). FED R. EVID. 702 requires that expert testimony be
"based upon sufficient facts or data." The existing facts and data do not demonstrate that
forensic scientists can identify a unique set of markers for every distinct object.
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encourage reforms designed to put a scientific foundation beneath
forensic identification, and place appropriate limits on what expert
witnesses may assert. Forensic identification scientists can help
themselves immediately by forswearing exaggerated, definitive
conclusions in favor of humbler, scientifically justifiable, and
probabilistic conclusions.

